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Abstract 
 The main objective of this study was to investigate the influence of 
human behavior on the success of public infrastructural megaprojects in 
Kenya. The need for this study arose from the thesis that complexity due to 
human behavior is the main cause of waste and failure that results in 
infrastructural megaprojects being delivered over budget, behind schedule, 
with benefit shortfalls, over and over again. The study was designed as 
multiple-method research, based on virtual constructionist ontology 
recognizing that complexity is the mid-point between order and disorder. A 
cross-sectional census survey of 27 completed public infrastructural 
megaprojects was conducted using two interlinked questionnaires assessing 
human behavior constructs and project success. A total of 108 respondents 
made up of project managers, team members and organizational sponsors, 
participated in this study. Using both descriptive and inferential analysis, the 
results of this study have confirmed that human behavior significantly 
influences success of public infrastructural megaprojects. Optimism bias 
remains the main individual behavior that leads to cost and schedule 
underperformance in infrastructural megaprojects but loss aversion is the 
most occurring cognitive bias. In light of this finding, the study recommends 
that implementing organizations adopt structures that allow for continued 
business justification, focus on products and give project managers sufficient 
authority over project resources in line with the postulations of the structural 
contingency theory. 
 
Keywords: Optimism bias, sunk cost effect, megaproject, complexity, 
human behavior 
 
Introduction 
 The International Centre for Complex Project Management (ICCPM) 
describes complex projects as those characterized by uncertainty, ambiguity, 
with emergent dynamic interfaces, influenced by significant political or 
European Scientific Journal December 2017 edition Vol.13, No.34 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
314 
external change, are run over a period which exceeds the product life cycles 
of the technologies involved or where significant integration issues exist; are 
defined by effect (benefit and value) but not by solution (product) at 
inception (Hayes & Bennet, 2011). This description is important in 
distinguishing complex systems from complicated ones, which have many 
moving parts that operate in patterned ways. Organizational complicatedness 
is usually measured based on the number of procedures, vertical layers, 
interface structures, coordination bodies and decision approvals (Morieux, 
2011). Complex systems by contrast are imbued with features that may 
operate in patterned ways but whose interactions are continually changing. 
According to Sargut and McGrath (2011), three properties determine the 
complexity of the environment namely; multiplicity, interdependence and 
diversity.  
 Several studies linking complexity with project success have 
confirmed that complexity predominantly determines project success 
(Meyer, 2014; Hargen & Park, 2013; O’Donnell, 2010; Shermon, 2011, 
Flyvbjerg, Holm & Buhl, 2004; Vanston & Vanston, 2004). Infrastructural 
megaprojects are among the most complex category of project (Brady & 
Davies (2014). These projects are usually large-scale, complex ventures that 
cost billions of money, take many years to develop and build, involve 
multiple public and private stakeholders, are transformational, and impact 
millions of people (Flyvbjerg, 2014). They are “greenfield” in nature as they 
often create new assets and utilize a variety of delivery models depending on 
their inherent complexity. In Kenya, megaprojects are increasingly used as 
the preferred delivery model for goods and services across a range of 
businesses and sectors. Such projects include the Standard Gauge Railway, 
the Konza techno-city, the LAPPSET Corridor and the Thika Superhighway, 
to mention but a few.  
 Inherent complexity in megaprojects is the main source of contextual 
risk which is usually referred to as typological risk (Omonyo, 2015). The 
magnitude of this risk increases as we move from an environment of low 
complexity towards high complexity. The effectiveness of project control is 
usually affected by typological risk in such a way that as the value of the 
typological risk increases, exercising project control becomes more difficult. 
This inability to control complexity has been recognized as a major factor in 
project failure for a number of years (Williams, 1999). However, complexity 
remains ambiguous and ill-defined in much of the project management 
literature (Geraldi, 2008). This could explain why complex infrastructural 
megaprojects are usually delivered over budget, behind schedule, with 
benefit shortfalls, over and over again; what Flyvbjerg (2014) characterizes 
as the “iron law of megaprojects”. According to Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) and Lovallo and Kahneman (2003), human behavior is the main 
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explanation for the iron law of megaprojects. It is this thesis that necessitated 
this study.  
 This study, through a cross-sectional census survey of completed 
complex public infrastructural megaprojects investigates the influence of 
human behavior on success of public infrastructural megaprojects in Kenya. 
The main contributions of this research include: confirming that human 
behavior has significant negative influence on success of public 
infrastructural megaprojects; optimism bias remains the main individual 
behavior associated with cost overruns and schedule delays; loss aversion is 
the most occurring cognitive bias among the individual systematic biases; 
and public infrastructural megaprojects in Kenya are delivered within a 
culture that does not recognize uncertainty, rapid change, emergence, 
connectedness and dependencies that characterize the context of these 
projects.  
 For the remainder of this article, I review relevant theoretical and 
empirical literature which presents an argument for the hypothesis of the 
study. This is followed by a description of the research design, data analysis 
and results together with a discussion of those results. The final section 
provides conclusions from the study and implications for both research and 
practice. 
 
Literature Review and Hypothesis 
 To underscore the importance of complexity in determining project 
outcomes, Project Management Institute (PMI) published a global practice 
guide on navigating complexity in 2014. According to this standard, the 
causes of complexity in projects and programs are grouped into human 
behavior, system behavior and ambiguity. Of these causes, human behavior 
is said to be the main explanation for delivering megaprojects with cost 
overruns, behind schedule, with benefit shortfalls, over and over again 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2014). 
Human behavior may be the result of factors such as changing power 
relationships, political influence, and individuals’ experiences and 
perspectives (PMI, 2014). These factors may hinder the clear identification 
of project goals and objectives, thus affecting the project delivery capability. 
The PMI Practice Guide for Navigating Complexity identifies four main 
constructs of human behavior namely; individual behavior, group, 
organizational and political behavior, communication and control, and 
organizational design and development. A broad description of each of these 
constructs and therefore, of human behavior, is to be found in the discipline 
of organization theory.  
 Organization theory describes a body of knowledge that brings 
together several management and organization theories. The main 
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approaches in organization theory stem from the works of the main schools 
of management thought namely; classical, human relations, systems, 
contingency, decision and social action (Mullins, 2007). As a body of 
knowledge, organization theory studies organizational designs and 
structures, relationships of organizations with their external environment and 
behavior of managers and technocrats within organizations. Besides 
suggesting ways in which organizations can cope with rapid change, 
organization theory provides a framework of studying organizations to 
identify the patterns and structures they use to solve problems, maximize 
efficiency and productivity and meet the expectations of stakeholders. A 
related (even though widely held as distinct) body of knowledge relates to 
organization behavior. Organization behavior involves understanding of 
individual and group behavior, and patterns of structure in order to help 
improve organizational performance and effectiveness (Mullins, 2007). The 
theories of organization behavior relate to the understanding, prediction and 
management of human behavior in organizations (Luthans, 2002).  
 According to Wagner and Hollenbeck (2010), the study of 
organization theory can be divided into three levels namely; micro, meso and 
macro. The first level involves the study of individuals in organization, the 
second level involves the study of work groups and the third level involves 
the study of how organizations behave. It can be concluded therefore that 
organization behavior is a subset of organization theory and that each of the 
levels in the study of organization theory represents the main constructs of 
human behavior in organizations, namely; the individual, the group and the 
organization (Mullins, 2007; PMI, 2014). 
 There are several management and organization theories that explain 
human behavior, some of which are described by Miles (2012). However, for 
the purposes of this study, three theories were used, namely; agency theory at 
the micro level, social identity theory at the meso level and structural 
contingency theory at the macro level. Agency theory, also referred to as 
principal-agent problem or agency dilemma, relates to risk sharing among 
groups that are in a contractual relationship. With its roots in behavioral 
economics, agency theory has been applied extensively in organization 
behavior (Eisenhardt, 1985; 1988). Agency problem occurs when 
cooperating parties have different goals and vision of labor (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). As such, this theory is concerned with resolving two 
problems that can occur in agency relationships-the first arising when the 
desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and the second arising 
when it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is 
actually doing. The second is the problem of risk sharing that arises when the 
principal and agent have different attitudes toward risk. For instance, in a 
cost-plus percentage fee contract, a contractor may have no incentive to 
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reduce costs since the higher the delivery cost, the higher their fee. Likewise, 
a project manager may see no value in terminating a failing project because 
of individual benefit. Given the operation of the agency problem, 
organizations are faced with the problem of integrating the individual and the 
organization to enable successful delivery of its initiatives and this requires 
the understanding of both human personality and formal organization. This 
integration recognizes that individuals behave differently when acting in 
their organizational role than when acting separately from the organization 
(Chester, 1938). Thus, agency theory is key in explaining how individual 
behavior affects key organizational outcomes. This study takes the view that 
all dysfunctional individual behaviors and cognitive biases such as optimism 
bias, loss aversion, misrepresentation, etc., arise out of the lack of integration 
between individual and organizational goals, and also out of their differences 
in risk taking. 
 Many studies have been conducted linking individual behaviors with 
project success. For instance, in a study to establish the effect of optimism 
bias on the decision to terminate failing projects, Meyer (2014) showed that 
in-project optimism bias is a significant contributor to decision maker’s 
motivation to continue with a failing project. For post-project optimism bias, 
the study showed that it is prevalent throughout the project and increases as 
the project approaches the end. The conclusions of this study are in line with 
the findings of Lovallo and Kahnemann (2003) whose research concluded 
that optimism and risk aversion were the main biases in forecasting and risk 
taking and that these two undermine executives’ decision-making. Mackie 
and Preston (1998) also found optimism to be among the 21 sources of error 
and bias in appraisal of transport projects. In a study to identify systematic 
biases in project failures, Shore (2008) conducted research on 8 large 
projects and wrote case studies on each failure to demonstrate how 
organizational and project culture could contribute to those biases. The 
findings of the study confirmed that there are indeed systematic biases and 
culture in project failure that are worth exploring. The main premise of this 
study was the fact that systematic biases are common in the human decision-
making process and this provides a fundamental reason why project failure 
should not be an unexpected result. In a  study of the causes of cost overruns 
in 258 transport infrastructure projects across 20 nations, Flyvbjerg, Holm 
and Buhl (2004) used Regression Analysis and concluded that 
underestimation cannot be explained by error and is best explained by 
strategic misrepresentation, that is, lying, which is a manifestation of agency 
problem. This is in line with the findings in Bruzelius, Flyvbjerg and 
Rothengatter (2002) who in a study on improving accountability in 
megaprojects, argued that differences between forecasts and actual costs 
could only be explained by the strategic behavior of the project proponents. 
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They identify lack of long-term commitment, rent seeking behavior for 
special interest groups and the tendency to underestimate in tenders to get 
proposals accepted, as the main strategic behaviors of project proponents that 
adversely affect project outcomes.  
 A second set of organization theories that explain human behavior is 
the social identity theory as attributed to Tajfel (1978). This theory explains 
the behavior of individuals in groups based on the need to maintain their 
social identity. According to this theory, people work to achieve and 
maintain a positive social identity which is based  on favorable  comparisons  
made  among  groups  to  which  a  person belongs and groups to which a 
person does not belong,  and  if  social  identity is  unsatisfactory,  then 
people  strive  to  leave  their  current  groups  and  join  more  favorable 
groups, or they try to make their current groups more satisfactory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986). Social identity research findings suggest three important 
consequences for organizations (Miles, 2012), namely; employees select and 
perform activities that resonate with their social identities, and they tend to 
support organizations that support their social identities; social identification 
tends to influence important group outcomes, such as cohesion, cooperation,  
altruism,  and  positive evaluations of the group (Turner, 1982, 1984); and,  
as  employees  come  to  increasingly  identify  with  the  organization,  then  
the  values,  ideals,  and practices of that organization can be perceived as 
more unique, distinctive, and positive compared to other organizations. This 
theory provides key explanation for group behaviors such as groupthink, 
groupshift, self-organization and tribal mindset. It is at the centre of 
explaining the evolution of team and project culture.   
 The structural contingency theory is the third theory that explains 
human behavior particularly at the macro level. This theory stands on the 
premise that there is no one best organizational structure; rather, the 
appropriate organizational structure depends on the contingencies facing the 
organization (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Chandler, 1962). The theory posits that 
organizations will be  effective  if  managers  fit  characteristics  of  the  
organization, such  as  its  structure, with  contingencies  in  their  
environment (Donaldson, 2001). Such contingencies could include 
organizational maturity, culture, opacity, among others. One of the most 
important concepts in the theory is alignment An organization whose 
characteristics align with the contingencies in its situation will perform more 
effectively compared to an organization whose characteristics do not fit with 
the contingencies in its situation. According to the theory, there are two main 
contingencies that need to be considered: organizational size and 
organizational task (Miles, 2012). This theory is critical in explaining the 
organizational design and development construct. 
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 A number of studies have been conducted linking this theory to 
project outcomes. For instance, in a study involving a critical review of 
extant literature, Olaniran, Love, Edwards, Olatunji and Mathews (2015) 
conclude that complex interactions between project characteristics, people, 
technology, and structure and culture contribute to the occurrence of cost 
overruns in hydrocarbon megaprojects. In exploring the role of project 
management maturity (PMM) and organizational culture in perceived 
performance, Yazici (2009) conducted a survey-based research with 86 
project professionals from the manufacturing and service sectors in the 
United States of America. This study revealed that PMM is significantly 
related to business performance but not to project performance. According to 
this study, organizational culture change towards sharing, collaboration and 
empowerment, is required in order to deal with (overruns) in project time, 
cost and expectations. In a study of cost and time overruns in public sector 
projects, Morris (1990) identified bureaucratic indecision and a lack of 
coordination between enterprises to be among the main causes of cost and 
time overruns in large public sector projects. Both these factors map onto 
organizational design and development as an aspect of human behavior. In a 
similar study, Kaliba, Muya and Mumba (2008) conducted a study on cost 
escalation and schedule delays in road construction projects in Zambia and 
found that administrative structures and inexperienced administrative 
personnel were among the factors that explained cost overruns. 
 In conclusion, the literature reviewed suggests that human behavior 
can have either positive or negative outcomes depending on the context. For 
instance, some positive psychologists postulate that optimism could be a 
very positive force at the workplace as it could motivate project teams to 
work harder, have high levels of inspiration and set stretch goals (Luthans, 
2002). In the same veil, negative psychologists believe that optimism has a 
downside effect that could lead to dysfunctional outcomes. With this 
understanding, this study tested a non-directional research hypothesis that: 
HA1: Human behavior has significant influence on success of public 
infrastructural megaprojects. 
 Another set of theory relevant to this research study was the project 
success theory. Project success theory is generally presented as a body of 
knowledge bringing together various research contributions to the success 
school of project management. Our review shows that there have been 
various attempts over the history of project management to define suitable 
criteria against which to anchor and measure project success (McLeod, 
Doolin & MacDonell, 2012). The most recognized of these measures is the 
long established and widely used “iron triangle” of time, cost and quality 
(Atkinson, 1999; Cooke-Davies, 2002; de Wit, 1988, Ika, 2009; Jugdev, 
Thomas, & Delisle, 2001). However, the “iron triangle” dimensions are 
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inherently limited in scope (Atkinson, 1999; Ika, 2009; Wateridge, 1998). A 
project that satisfies these criteria may still be considered a failure; 
conversely a project that does not satisfy them may be considered successful 
(Baccarini, 1999; de Wit, 1988, Ika, 2009). The “iron triangle” only focuses 
on the project management process and does not incorporate the views and 
objectives of all stakeholders (Atkinson, 1999; Baccarini, 1999; Bannerman, 
2008; de Wit, 1988; Jugdev & Muller, 2005; Wateridge, 1998). 
 In recognition that project success is more than project management 
success and that it needs to be measured against overall objectives of the 
project thus reflecting a distinction between the success of a project’s 
process and that of its product (Baccarini, 1999; Markus & Mao, 2004; 
Wateridge, 1998), researchers have broadened the scope of project success to 
include three key measures, namely; process success, product success and 
organizational success (McLeod et al., 2012). Product success involves such 
criteria as product use, client satisfaction and client benefits. Organizational 
success criteria incorporates achievement of broader set of organizational 
objectives involving benefits to the wider stakeholder base (see Shenhar, 
Dvir, & Levy, 1997; Shenhar, Dvir, Levy & Maltz, 2001; Shenhar & Dvir, 
2007; Hoegl & Gemuenden, 2001). This is plausible given that projects are a 
means of delivering the organization’s strategic objectives. Proponents of 
this school of thought advocate for inclusion of success criteria such as 
business and strategic benefits. 
 
Research Conceptual Model and Hypothesis 
 Figure 1 illustrates the hypothesized research conceptual model 
which is based on PMI (2014) and McLeod et al. (2012). According to this 
model, human behavior as defined by individual behavior, group behavior 
and organizational design and development, represent independent variable 
while success of infrastructural megaprojects (defined as process, product 
and organizational success) was identified as the dependent variable.  
 
 
 
 
European Scientific Journal December 2017 edition Vol.13, No.34 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
321 
Method 
Context and Design 
 This study was operationalized through exploratory, descriptive and 
explanatory research goals based on Neuman (2003) classification of 
research goals. To achieve these goals, a post-positivist philosophy 
emphasizing virtual constructionist ontology (Gauthier & Ika, 2012) was 
assumed. This philosophy utilizes both interpretivist (Bryman & Bell, 2007) 
and pragmatist (Goldkuhl, 2012) epistemologies to generate knowledge 
based on a combination of deductive and inductive approaches. The choice 
of this philosophical perspective was guided by the social world of complex 
megaprojects. In this social world, complexity is the midpoint between order 
and disorder, and megaproject management is neither a practice nor a tool 
(as is the case with projects implemented in the modern social world) but a 
rallying rhetoric in a context of power play, domination and control 
(Gauthier & Ika, 2012).  
 This study was designed to be mixed-method research combining 
both quantitative and qualitative strategies (Burch & Carolyn, 2016). The 
mixed-method research provides an epistemological paradigm that occupies 
the conceptual space between positivism and interpretivism (Tashakkori & 
Creswell, 2007), the main epistemologies on which the virtual 
constructionist ontology thrives. To generate data for this study, a cross-
sectional census survey design was used. This design entails the collection of 
data (predominantly by questionnaire or structured interview) on usually 
quite a lot more than one case and at a single point in time in order to collect 
a body of quantitative or quantifiable data in connection with two or more 
variables, which are then examined to detect patterns of association (Bryman 
& Bell, 2007).  
 
Population and Sample 
 This study had as its primary population public sector infrastructural 
megaprojects implemented by the government of Kenya since 2005. 
Following Flyvbjerg (2014), the minimum budget for megaprojects included 
in this study was approximately Ksh. 1 billion. Managers, team members, 
sponsors and key stakeholders of these projects constituted the population of 
respondents from whom data was collected. A total of 31 projects were 
included in this study. For each project, four respondents comprising the 
project manager, project sponsor and two project team members were 
surveyed. In total, 108 respondents participated in this study. A total of 27 
completed infrastructural megaprojects, representing a response rate of 
87.1%, were surveyed as part of this research. Of these projects, 2 were from 
Kenya Ports Authority, 2 were from Kenya Pipeline Company, 6 were from 
Kenya Airports Authority, 3 were from Kenya Power and Lighting 
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Company, 1 was from Kenya Electricity Generating Company, 5 were from 
Kenya Urban Roads Authority, 1 was from Kenya Civil Aviation Authority, 
1 was from Geothermal Development Company, with the remaining 6 
coming from Kenya National Highways Authority.  
 
Instruments and Data Collection 
 Fieldwork for this study utilized two interlinked questionnaires 
namely, the human behavior assessment questionnaire and the project 
success questionnaire. The human behavior questionnaire was constructed 
based on the Practice Guide for Navigating Complexity (PMI, 2014) while 
the project success questionnaire was developed based on the works of 
Shenhar and Dvir (2001) and McLeod et al. (2012). Questionnaire survey is 
hailed to be an efficient data collection mechanism when the researcher 
knows exactly what is required and how to measure the variables of interest 
(Neuman, 2003). The human behavior scale comprised a 22-item Likert-type 
scale with the responses on each item being rated on a 5-point mutually 
exclusive scale where a rating of 1 denoted a “strongly agree” response, 2 
denoted “agree” response, 3 denoted “somewhat agree” response, 4 denoted 
“disagree” response, while 5 denoted a “strongly disagree” response. A 
choice of either 1 (strongly agree) or 2 (agree) implied low complexity while 
a choice of either 4 (disagree) or 5 (strongly disagree) implied high 
complexity due to human behavior. A choice of 3 (somewhat disagree) 
implied a neutral and borderline response which did not communicate much 
on the complexity of projects studied and was therefore dropped from further 
analysis. The success scale comprised 18 items blending open and closed 
ended questions on one part and Likert-type questions on the other part. The 
first part involving closed and open ended questions was meant to assess 
process success while the Likert-type questions assessed product and 
organizational success on a scale of 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly 
disagree).  
           The first phase of data collection involved a pilot study on four 
projects to test the reliability and validity of the instruments. The results of 
the pilot study showed that both instruments were reliable with the human 
behavior scale recording internal reliability of 0.879. The overall internal 
reliability of the success scale was 0.889, both these values are greater than 
the cut-off Cronbach’s alpha of 0.7 (Nunnally, 1978). The pilot study results 
also demonstrated high concept, construct, and external reliability, in the 
study instruments. The second phase involved using revised study 
instruments to collect primary data from the remaining 24 projects. 
Generally, the projects surveyed had a budget at appraisal ranging from 
approximately Ksh. 1 Billion to Ksh. 40 Billion with 8 of these projects 
(29.6%) having a budget at appraisal of over Ksh. 10 Billion. The scheduled 
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duration for these projects ranged from 4 months to 72 months with most 
projects having a scheduled duration of above 20 months. The project 
locations were spread across several counties in Kenya. All the projects were 
turnkey, involving a variation of Engineer-Procure-Construct and Design-
Build-Transfer delivery arrangements. 
 
Data Analysis and Results 
 Collected data was processed and analyzed using Microsoft Access 
2010, IBM’s SPSS version 20 and Microsoft Excel 2010. Quantitative data 
analysis was conducted using both descriptive and inferential statistics. The 
main descriptive statistics used were the mean, standard deviation, 
coefficient of variation, indices, skewness, kurtosis and percentages. The 
inferential statistics used were F-test, t-test, Pearson correlation coefficients, 
coefficients of determination and tests of significance. Qualitative data 
analysis was done through expert judgment, scenario mapping and critical 
thinking. Data presentation was largely through text, figures, tables, 
numerical values and equations. The results are presented per construct in the 
sections that follow. 
 
Infrastructural Megaproject Success 
 Infrastructural Megaproject success was measured along three 
constructs namely process, product and organizational success. Process 
success incorporates the traditional measures of efficiency (delivery within 
budget and time schedule) and quality. Efficiency was measured using the 
cost and schedule performance indices with the weighted average of these 
indices calculated to denote the overall efficiency index for the project. The 
CPI results show that 14 projects (52%) were delivered over budget, 9 
projects (33%) were delivered on budget with the remaining 4 (15%) being 
delivered under budget. SPI results show that of the 27 megaprojects 
surveyed, 22 (81%) were delivered behind schedule, 3 (11%) were delivered 
on schedule while 2 (7%) were delivered ahead of schedule. Simple 
weighted averages of the CPI and SPI values were calculated to give the 
Weighted Project Efficiency (WPE) values for each project. Using these 
values, a total of 4 megaprojects (15%) had efficiency levels greater or equal 
to 1 (100%). The rest (85%) of the megaprojects were delivered at efficiency 
levels lower than 100%. As shown in Table 6, the energy sector projects had 
the lowest relative cost performance (CV=0.42) but had the highest schedule 
(CV=0.19) and overall efficiency (CV=0.14) performances. The roads sector 
scored highest on cost performance (CV=0.16) while ports (air and sea) 
projects scored lowest in both schedule performance (CV=0.47) and overall 
efficiency (CV=0.31).  
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SECTOR 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EFFICIENCY MEASURES 
CPI  SPI  WPE  
MEAN STDEV CV MEAN STDEV CV MEAN STDEV CV 
Ports 
9n  
0.85 0.17 0.20 0.79 0.37 0.47 0.80 0.25 0.31 
Energy 
7n  
0.97 0.41 0.42 0.78 0.15 0.19 0.88 0.12 0.14 
Roads 
11n  
0.91 0.15 0.16 0.66 0.19 0.28 0.79 0.12 0.15 
   Table 1: Project Efficiency by Sector 
 
 The process success score was determined by adding a score for 
project quality to the score for project efficiency. The quality score was 
based on the effect of changes (if any) to the scope baseline and was based 
on a scale of 1 (no or low impact) to 3 (high impact). The results showed that 
6 megaprojects (22%) underwent more than three scope changes, 13 
megaprojects (48%) underwent up to 3 scope changes while 8 megaprojects 
(30%) did not undergo any scope change. Product and organizational success 
were measured using a 9-item questionnaire of Likert-type scale with 
respondents being asked to respond to each item based on a 5-point scale 
(1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=somewhat disagree, 4=agree, 5=strongly 
agree). A score of 1 indicated low success score and 5 indicated high success 
score. Product success measures the effectiveness of the project in delivering 
a product that meets the customer requirements, improves customer 
performance, and satisfies customer needs. Organizational success measures 
the interaction of process and product success to meet organizational 
objectives, maximize stakeholder value, and enhance organizational 
innovation capacity to deliver future projects. The results indicate that the 
projects had a mean product success score of 4.09 with a standard deviation 
of 0.94, and a mean organizational score of 4.39 with a standard deviation of 
0.82. The overall success scores were obtained by taking the simple 
weighted average of the mean success scores for process, product and 
organizational dimensions. With the highest score assigned to process, 
product and organizational dimensions being 8, 5, and 5 respectively, the 
highest possible mean composite success score was therefore 6.  
  
Human Behavior 
 Human behavior was measured using three constructs, namely; 
individual behavior, group behavior and organizational design and 
development. Individual behavior was measured using a 7-item Likert type 
scale assessing cognitive biases in human behavior while group behavior was 
measured based on a 7-item Likert type scale assessing team commitment, 
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cohesion, co-responsibility, top management support and motivation. 
Complexity due to organizational design and development was measured 
using two sets of indicators- alignment, opacity and process maturity as one 
set, and organization structure, stakeholder engagement and culture as 
another. Complexity based on alignment, opacity and process maturity was 
measured using an 8-item Likert type scale. Data on organization structure 
and stakeholder engagement was collected using a checklist in which the 
respondents were required to select the statements that applied to their 
projects. 
 Based on the responses, the items on the individual behavior scale 
were mapped onto common cognitive biases that have been linked to project 
failures by past researches and in extant literature. The first item on the scale 
mapped onto the “framing effect” bias, the second item mapped onto 
“anchoring” bias, the third and the fourth items mapped onto “optimism 
bias”, the fifth item mapped onto “misrepresentation/noble lying”, the sixth 
item mapped onto “resistance to change” bias while the seventh item mapped 
onto “loss aversion/sunk cost effect” bias. Using the responses for those who 
either disagreed or strongly disagreed, the results show that loss aversion 
(sunk cost effect) was the most cited individual behavior exhibited by the 
projects (48.1%) followed by optimism bias (25.9%), misrepresentation 
(14.8%), anchoring bias (7.4%) and resistance to change (3.7%). Table 2 
summarizes cost and schedule performance for projects exhibiting the 
identified cognitive biases, with the general result that projects that exhibited 
optimism bias had most of them delivered with budget overrun and schedule 
delay. 
Individual Behavior % of Projects 
Exhibiting 
Behavior 
% Delivered 
Within Budget 
% Delivered 
Within Schedule 
% Delivered 
With Budget 
Overrun and 
Schedule Delay 
Anchoring bias 7.4 50 0 50 
Optimism bias  25.9 42.9 0 57.1 
Misrepresentation 14.8 25 25 50 
Resistance to change 3.7 100 0 0 
Loss aversion (Sunk 
Cost effect) 
48.1 46.2 15.4 46.2 
Table 2: Individual Behaviors and Performance 
 
 Since individual behavior can collectively define the culture of an 
organization, the individual behavior systematic biases identified were 
mapped onto four dimensions of organizational culture using the Competing 
Values Model (Livari & Huisman, 2007), in order to determine the culture of 
each project. The dimensions are internal focus, external focus, stability and 
change. The results show that all projects exhibiting the identified biases 
mapped onto a project culture that can be characterized as having a 
preference for an internal focus and stability. These biases were associated 
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with escalation in cost and schedule overrun. Table 3 shows the mapping of 
the individual behaviors on the competitive values model. 
Cognitive Bias % of Projects 
Exhibiting 
Bias 
Dimensions of Competing Values Model Implied 
  Internal 
Focus 
External 
Focus 
Stability Change 
Anchoring Bias 7.4     
Optimism Bias  25.9     
Misrepresentation 14.8     
Resistance to Change 3.7     
Loss Aversion (Sunk 
Cost Effect) 
48.1     
Table 3: Cognitive Biases Mapped onto Competing Values Model 
 
 Analysis of project delivery was conducted based on the responses in 
the GB scale and summarized as shown in Table 4. Overall, the results show 
that low complexity (strongly agree/disagree responses) was associated with 
somewhat better project delivery compared to instances of high complexity 
(disagree/strongly disagree response). 
Item in the Scale Responses 
Strongly Agree/Agree Strongly Disagree/Disagree 
% of Projects Delivering 
Within 
% of Projects Delivering 
Within 
Budget Schedule Budget Schedule 
Senior management team and other 
key stakeholders were fully 
committed to the project  
48.2 18.5 - - 
The project had the support, 
commitment and priority from the 
organization and functional groups  
52.0 20.0 - - 
The project team was cohesive and 
always worked towards common 
goals and objectives  
54.2 20.8 - - 
Contractual terms were well 
understood by all parties involved  
55 25 0 0 
The project team members were co-
located, co-incentivized and co-
responsible for the outputs of their 
projects  
38.9 16.7 33.3 0 
The project team members 
primarily worked face to face 
(rather than virtually) throughout 
the life of the project  
47.4 10.5 0 0 
Team members or stakeholders 
were able to accept the project 
information that may have been 
contrary to their beliefs, 
assumptions or perspectives  
50.0 16.7 25.0 0 
Table 4: Cost and Schedule Performance Based on Group Behavior Responses 
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 Responses to the first set of items measuring organizational design 
and development were analyzed and linked to cost and schedule performance 
as shown in Table 5. Whereas the distinction in cost performance based on 
complexity levels is not apparent, the results indicate that projects that had 
low complexity recorded relatively better schedule performance compared to 
those with high complexity. 
Item in the Scale Responses 
Strongly Agree/Agree Strongly Disagree/Disagree 
% of Projects Delivering 
Within 
% of Projects Delivering 
Within 
Budget Schedule Budget Schedule 
Alignment:     
The project had clearly defined 
boundaries with other projects and 
initiatives that were running in 
parallel  
47.8 21.7 100 0 
The organization had the right 
people with the necessary skills and 
competences as well as the tools, 
techniques or resources to support 
the project  
54.5 22.7 0 0 
There was an effective portfolio 
management process within the 
organization to facilitate strategic 
alignment and enable successful 
delivery of projects  
41.2 17.6 50 0 
Opacity:     
The sponsor or project organization 
made decisions, determined 
strategies, and set priorities in a 
manner that promotes transparency 
and trust 
50.0 20.8 0 0 
There was open communication, 
collaboration and trust among the 
stakeholders and project team 
47.8 13 0 0 
Process Maturity:     
It was feasible to obtain accurate 
status reporting throughout the life 
of the project  
52.2 21.7 100 0 
The client created and ensured the 
use of common processes across all 
projects 
47.4 21.1 66.7 0 
The project manager had the 
authority to apply internal or 
external resources to project 
activities 
45.5 18.2 40 10 
Table 5: Delivery Based on Alignment, Opacity and process Maturity 
 
 Data on organization structure showed that the megaprojects studied 
fall into two main categories following the classification by Shenhar and 
Dvir (2007). Most of the projects were system projects which produced a 
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single outcome such as the KCAA Headquarter building, comprising a 
collection of assemblies, components and subsystems. Yet others, such as the 
Mombasa Port Modernization Project, were array projects (system of 
systems) that integrated a collection of systems functioning together to 
achieve a common goal. The results show that the number of layers in the 
governance structure of the projects was related to their cost and schedule 
performance in such a way that structures with less than 10 layers had better 
cost and schedule performance compared with those with more layers.  
 All the 27 megaprojects studied were organized in a “one-size-fits-
all” approach with 9 (33.3%) of these megaprojects being delivered through 
a pure functional structure, 5 megaprojects (18.5%) through a weak matrix 
structure, another 18.5% being delivered through a strong matrix structure 
and the remaining 8 megaprojects (29.6%) being delivered through a 
projectized structure. The projects that were organized through a weak 
matrix structure had the highest relative variability in their mean success 
(CV=0.29) followed by those that were organized through a pure functional 
structure (CV=0.18). Projects organized through a strong matrix structure 
recorded the lowest relative variability in mean success (CV=0.13) followed 
by those utilizing a projectized structure (CV=0.16). On stakeholder 
management, the main forms of engagement were through site meetings and 
progress reports, with some projects involving stakeholders only in 
preparatory stages. Stakeholder engagement was a formal role in only 4 
projects (14.8%) with 6 projects (22.2%) having a clearly documented 
stakeholder engagement plan that was used to manage stakeholders.  
 
Hypothesis Testing 
 The human behavior complexity score for each project was 
determined based on the scores of the individual constructs. These scores 
were based on the mean response scores for each item in the questionnaire. 
Based on the scale, the lowest score was 1 (implying lowest complexity) and 
the highest score was 5 (implying highest complexity). The results show that 
individual behavior returned a mean complexity score of 2.21 with a 
standard deviation of 0.62, while group behavior had a mean complexity 
score of 3.29 with a standard deviation of 1.02. Organizational design and 
development recorded a mean complexity score of 1.97 with 0.60 standard 
deviation while the overall weighted complexity score had a mean of 1.87 
with a standard deviation of 0.50. To enable use of these scores in parametric 
tests (such as correlation and regression analysis), their coefficients of 
skewness and kurtosis were determined to ensure that the data meet the 
normality assumption of parametric tests. The results show coefficients of 
skewness which are within the -1 to +1 range and coefficients of kurtosis 
European Scientific Journal December 2017 edition Vol.13, No.34 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
329 
which are also within the recommended range of -2.2 to +2.2 (Sposito, Hand, 
& Skarpness, 1983).  
 To test the hypothesis that human behavior has a significant influence 
on success of public infrastructural projects, the mean scores of human 
behavior constructs were first correlated with those of project success 
constructs to determine if they have any association. The results showed that 
at 99% confidence level, there was a strong significant positive correlation 
between product success and organizational success ( 709.0r ). At 99% 
confidence level, the results showed that: there is significant moderate 
positive correlation between individual and group behavior (r=0.674); the 
correlation between individual behavior and organizational design and 
development is moderately positive and significant (r=0.539); there is a 
significant strong positive correlation between group behavior and 
organizational design and development (r=0.783); and group behavior has 
the strongest significant positive correlation with the weighted human 
behavior complexity (r=0.995) followed by organizational design and 
development (r=0.0.866) and individual behavior (r=0.816).  
 On the relationship between human behavior and project success, the 
results indicate that at 99% confidence level, group behavior and overall 
human behavior have significant but negative correlation with process 
success (r=-.639, and r=-.575, respectively). At 95% confidence level, the 
results indicate that individual behavior and organizational design and 
development have significant but negative correlation with process success 
(r=-.387, and r=-.430, respectively) and that organizational design and 
development has a significant negative correlation with product success (r=-
.415). It is indicated that at the 99% confidence level, all the three constructs 
of human behavior have significant, though negative correlation with the 
overall project success. Further, the results show that human behavior has a 
significant negative correlation with overall project success.  
 Causal relationship between human behavior (HB) and megaproject 
success (PS) was tested using OLS linear regression at the 95% confidence 
level using a two-tailed test. The results indicate that the overall model had a 
46.3% predictive power (R2=0.463). ANOVA results showed that the overall 
model was significant with F(1,25) = 21.530 and P<0.025. The results 
indicated that there was no serial correlation in the data used to conduct 
regression analysis given a Durbin-Watson statistic less than 2. Data was 
also checked for collinearity using the Tolerance and VIF statistics. The 
results indicated a VIF value much lower than 4 which is used as the 
threshold to indicate multicollinearity (particularly in small samples) 
(O’Brien, 2007). The problem of heteroscedasticity was checked using 
residual statistics in a scatter plot. The results indicated that almost all the 
residuals had a mean of 0.000 and were approximately equally spread 
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implying that the data was homoscedastic and was therefore good for OLS 
regression analysis.  
The regression equation is presented below: 

iPS = iHB681.0421.6   
s( )

ib =(0.377)    (0.147) 
                                 t   (17.05)     (-4.64)           463.02 R  
At 95% confidence level with a two-tailed test, if the s( )

ib ˂ 







 
2
ib , the null 
hypothesis that 010  bb  is rejected and a conclusion is made that the 
betas are significant (Koutsoyiannis, 1992). In this study, the results show 
that the slope of human behavior is significant, implying that a one unit 
increase in the complexity score for human behavior reduces project success 
score by 0.681. Thus, the research hypothesis that human behavior has a 
significant influence on success of public infrastructural megaprojects is 
accepted. 
 
Discussion 
 This study used developments in project success theory to identify 
the broader measures of project success. The findings agree in part with the 
trending view that megaprojects are always delivered over budget, behind 
schedule, with benefit shortfalls, over and over again (Flyvbjerg, 2014). With 
52% of the projects having been delivered overbudget and 82% having been 
delivered behind schedule, the “iron law of megaprojects” is partly 
confirmed. Whereas existing positive literature indicates that one out of ten 
infrastructural megaprojects is delivered on budget and one out of ten 
megaprojects is delivered on schedule (Flyvbjerg, 2014), this study only 
confirms this to the extent that 11% of the projects were delivered on 
schedule. The short run results for project benefits, however, seem to 
disagree with the view that megaprojects are delivered with benefit 
shortfalls.  
 Results show that more of the variability in overall project efficiency 
is attributed to schedule performance than to cost performance and most 
projects that were delivered on or under budget experienced schedule delay. 
This is a key finding that may be pointing to the fact that most emphasis in 
megaproject management is directed on the cost element rather than to an 
integrated trade-off among cost, time and quality. It has been shown in 
earlier studies that project duration is positively associated with the size of 
cost overrun (Flyvbjerg et al., 2004). The findings of this study also add to 
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the growing view that operational excellence or process success does not 
necessarily imply project success (Baccarini, 1999; de Wit, 1988; Ika, 2009). 
For instance, when sectoral comparison was done, the ports sector had the 
lowest relative variability in process success (CV=0.29) but the highest 
relative variability in product (CV=0.20), organizational (CV=0.13) and 
composite (CV=0.12) success. The finding that a project that has high 
product success is also likely to have high organizational success supports 
the generally accepted project management principle of “focusing on 
products” as opposed to focusing on the activity (Axelos, 2017). The 
correlation results also showed that there is no significant correlation 
between process success and product or organizational success. This 
supports the argument of Baccarini (1999), de Wit (1988) and Ika (2009) 
who contend that a project that satisfies process criteria may still be 
considered a failure and a project that does not satisfy them may be 
considered successful.  
 The results of this study agree with the postulation of both positive 
and normative literature that optimism bias and the other biases in individual 
behavior have negative implications throughout the life cycle of programs 
and projects (PMI, 2014; Shore, 2008). With the results showing that 
projects exhibiting optimism bias had more incidences of delivery over 
budget and behind schedule compared to those exhibiting misrepresentation 
and loss aversion, this study is in consonance with the findings of Lovallo 
and Kahnemann (2003), Flyvbjerg et al. (2003), Kahnemann and Lovallo 
(1993), Wachs (1989:1986) and Meyer (2014), who posit that optimism bias 
is the main cause of delivery over budget and behind schedule.  
 The results also point to the fact that individual behaviors identified 
have more adverse effect on schedule performance compared to cost 
performance. Indeed, the mean cost performance for the entire sample was 
higher and more stable compared to the mean schedule performance. This 
finding may be pointing to the fact that public infrastructural megaproject 
sponsors feel more pressure from the public when projects are delivered over 
budget compared to when they are delivered behind schedule and so they 
prioritize cost performance over schedule performance. This may be 
counterproductive since previous studies have shown that implementation 
sluggishness has a significant relationship with cost escalation in 
infrastructure projects (Flyvbjerg, Holm, & Buhl, 2004).  
 The results of this study put misrepresentation in the second place 
among individual biases associated with cost overrun and schedule delay. 
Misrepresentation, which is sometimes referred to as “noble lying” has its 
support in Hirschman’s theory and a postulation that if people knew in 
advance the real challenges and costs involved in delivering megaprojects, 
they would probably never have touched them and nothing would get built 
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(Flyvbjerg, 2014). In terms of occurrence on projects, this study finds that 
loss aversion has almost twice the frequency of optimism bias and thrice the 
frequency of misrepresentation. These results corroborate with those of 
Shore (2008) who found twice as many incidences of sunk cost effect (loss 
aversion) in comparison with overconfidence (optimism). Continued 
exhibition of loss aversion bias on projects does not support the generally 
accepted project management principle of “continued business justification” 
(Axelos, 2017). According to this principle, a project can be canceled any 
time during its life cycle whenever it is found that its business case is not 
viable, desirable or achievable.  
 Top management support and support from other key stakeholders 
have long been recognized in extant literature as a key factor that contributes 
to project success (PMI, 2014; Hauschildt, Gesche, & Medcof, 2000). This is 
even more important for infrastructural megaprojects which are 
transformational in nature and whose budget may be more than the entire 
implementing organization’s asset base in real terms. In some cases, the 
project may be the only activity the organization is involved in over several 
years. For the most part, senior management confuse this support for 
micromanagement and may get involved in the day to day management of 
the project denying the project manager and the team the flexibility they 
require to manage the project as per the project charter. This 
micromanagement comes with a lot of interests, including issues of servitude 
(as identified in this study) which could lead to poor project delivery 
capability. It is not surprising therefore, that despite the centrality of top 
management support in delivering successful projects, this study found that 
less than 50% of the projects where senior management teams were fully 
committed to their course were delivered within budget and a dismal 18.5% 
were delivered within schedule.  
 Normative literature recognizes that team working can improve 
efficiency (Green, 1997) but team work does not guarantee in itself good 
results (Belbin, 1993). Rather, what is important is how the individuals 
within the group work cohesively together (Mullins, 2005). The various 
behaviors of the team members must mesh together in order to achieve 
objectives (Crainer, 1998). The results of this study confirmed that projects 
in which respondents strongly agreed that, the project team was cohesive and 
always worked towards common goals and objectives, recorded better cost 
and schedule performance with over 54% of those projects being delivered 
within budget. Again compared with the results in Flyvbjerg (2014), this is 
plausible.  
 The results of this study do not provide clear support for the benefits 
of co-locating, co-incentivizing and making teams co-responsible for project 
outputs. Normative literature postulates that co-location  is a factor in 
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ensuring rapid and faster communication when managing projects in 
dynamic environments (Collyer, 2016) and it enhances the ability of team 
members to perform as a team (PMI, 2013). Besides co-location, co-
incentivizing and making project teams co-responsible for project outputs is 
one way of dealing with the agency problem that manifests itself in 
infrastructural megaprojects. When teams are co-located, co-incentivized and 
co-responsible, innovation in handling emerging problems is usually 
enhanced and the teams are motivated to go out of their way in identifying 
early warning signs. It is expected that such teams are more agile and 
ambidextrous in resolving emerging issues and dealing with ambiguity and 
system dynamics. Working face-to-face on projects increases the chances of 
better performance. As the results of this study show, projects in which team 
members worked primarily face-to-face had better cost and schedule delivery 
compared to those that did not.  
 In strategic and organizational project management, projects are 
generally taken as the “tactics” of delivering strategic and organizational 
objectives. In that environment, the business case of the project is usually 
derived from that of the portfolio, programme or vision to which the project 
is directly traceable. In all cases, it is important that there exist an effective 
portfolio management process within the organization that facilitates 
strategic alignment to ensure that the right projects are implemented with the 
right resources within clearly defined boundaries and interfaces. 
Misalignment may result in conflicting priorities and direction for the 
program or project team (PMI, 2014). The findings of this study agree with 
this postulation and establishes that project misalignment adversely affects 
schedule delivery and to a considerable extent, budget delivery.  
 Organization design and development improves the organization’s 
visioning, empowerment, learning and problem solving processes (Mullins, 
2005), which are critical aspects of adaptive behavior that project managers 
require to successfully deliver complex megaprojects. However, this is only 
possible in an environment that promotes open communication and where 
project decisions, priorities and strategies are made transparently. Project 
complexity may increase where the organization conducts business in an 
opaque manner, leading to mistrust which may affect its outcomes. The 
findings of this study agree with this postulation to the extent that none of the 
projects in which decisions, strategies and priorities were made in a 
transparent manner, was delivered within budget or schedule. The results 
agree with the postulation in extant literature that effective communication 
has an impact on project execution and/or outcome (PMI, 2013; Olaniran, 
Love, Edwards, Olatunji, & Matthews, 2015).  
 It is also widely recognized in literature that trust within the project 
team and among team members has a positive effect on transfer of 
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knowledge (Holste & Fields, 20101; Maurer, 2010), which is critical for the 
team to explore and exploit decision choices in complex megaprojects. This 
study noted that in projects where there was no open communication, 
collaboration and trust among the stakeholders and project team, the 
probability of delivery within cost and schedule dropped from 47.8% and 
13% respectively, to 0%. Perhaps this finding provides a first level reply to 
Olaniran et al. (2015) who postulated that there is need for further empirical 
research to examine how communication influences megaproject 
performance.  
 There is evidence that project management maturity (PMM) is 
significantly related to business performance but not to project performance 
(Yazici, 2009). A critical aspect of PMM is process maturity which involves 
ensuring common processes are followed across all projects-of course with a 
considerable amount of tailoring. On whether PMM has a relationship with 
project performance, this study posts mixed findings-on one hand it is 
concluded that lack of process maturity has negative relationship with 
schedule delivery while the results are mixed on the relationship between 
lack of process maturity and cost performance. Thus, the results of this study 
partly disagrees with the findings of Yazici (2009).  
 Project organization provides the basic framework within which 
decisions are made and projects governed. Project governance enables 
organizations to consistently manage projects and maximize the value of 
project outcomes (PMI, 2013). It is argued that a project organization 
structure cannot be bad but can be inappropriate given the complexity of the 
project and the overall level of organizational maturity. This argument is 
supported by existing empirical literature which shows that project 
organization based on a “one-size-fits-all” approach can deliver successful 
projects just as a “tight-loose” system of systems approach (Brady & Davis, 
2014). The results of this study also support this view given that all projects 
studied were organized in a “one-size-fits-all” approach with 48.2% of these 
projects meeting their budget objective and 18.5% meeting the schedule 
objective. Strong matrix and projectized organization structures usually give 
the project manager full authority to make project decisions, within the 
constraints of the project charter. Project management success draws positive 
synergies from the authority of the project manager over project resources 
and it is highly likely that projects in which the project manager has near 
total authority over resources have more stable outcomes compared to those 
in which the project manager has weaker authority. The results of this study 
support this thesis, with the results showing more stable mean success results 
for projects utilizing strong matrix and projectized structures.  
 It is generally agreed that stakeholders can impact project outcomes 
and stakeholder satisfaction should be managed as a key project objective 
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(PMI,2013) just as time, cost, quality, risk, scope and benefits (Axelos, 
2017). Both ISO 21500:2012 and the PMBOK® Guide place stakeholder 
management at the centre of project management theory. However, this 
study finds that there is an identifiable gap between the prescriptions of 
theory and actual practice. Indeed, the results show a practice that is long on 
management for stakeholders and short on management of stakeholders. This 
is despite the fact that communication and stakeholder management are 
critical success factors for projects in complex contexts.  
 In line with the findings of Shore (2008) who found that failed 
projects map onto a culture that can be characterized as having preference for 
internal focus and stability, based on the individual behaviors and biases that 
were identified, this study affirmed that all the projects exhibiting those 
biases operated in a culture characterized with internal focus and stability. 
This type of culture is generally suitable for organizations that operate in 
more deterministic environments characterized with more stable outcomes. 
Public infrastructural megaprojects are implemented in complex 
environments in which hindsight does not affect foresight and emergence is 
order of the day. These projects require a more adaptive culture capable of 
assimilating the emergence of external stimuli and inherent change. 
 
Conclusion  
 The findings of this study contribute to and reinforce the 
developments in the behavior school of thought in project management 
research (Turner et al., 2010). The study advances the finding that human 
behavior has a significant influence on success of public infrastructural 
megaprojects. Individual behavior, group behavior and organizational design 
and development, all have a significant but negative correlation with process 
success. Only organizational design and development has a significant 
correlation with product success. Optimism bias remains the main individual 
behavior that leads to cost and schedule underperformance in infrastructural 
megaprojects but loss aversion is the most occurring cognitive bias. Despite 
the rapid change, uncertainty, dependency and emergence that characterize 
public infrastructural megaprojects, implementation of these projects still 
assumes a culture that is characterized by stability and internal focus. 
 Where the organization does not have the right people with the 
necessary skills and competences as well as the tools, techniques or 
resources to support the project, the probability of delivery over budget is 
escalated. Indeed, projects in which the project manager has near total 
authority over resources have more stable outcomes compared to those in 
which the project manager has weaker authority. Likewise, projects in which 
contractual terms are well understood by all parties involved, team members 
are co-located, co-incentivized and co-responsible for the outputs of their 
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projects, team members primarily work face to face (rather than virtually) 
throughout the life of the project, and team members or stakeholders are able 
to accept the project information that may be contrary to their beliefs, 
assumptions or perspectives, have better delivery capability.  
 
Recommendation 
As a step towards reversing the effects of the iron law of 
megaprojects, and in so far as poor performance in megaprojects is attributed 
to human behavior, it is recommended that implementing organizations 
adopt and utilize project structures that: allow project managers sufficient 
authority over project resources; allow for stakeholder satisfaction to be  
managed as a key project objective; allow for transparency in the manner in 
which organizations make project decisions; ensure right people with the 
necessary skills and competences as well as the tools, techniques or 
resources support the project; encourage innovation, creativity, learning and 
attainment of process maturity; and, ensure continued business case 
justification to assure that the project is and remains viable, desirable and 
achievable. 
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